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or China, the ability to prevent a U.S. carrier strike group from intervening 
in the event of a Taiwan Strait crisis is critical. Beijing’s immediate strategic 
concerns have been defi ned with a high level of clarity. The Chinese are inter-
ested in achieving an antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) capability because it of-
fers them the prospect of limiting the ability of other nations, particularly the 
United States, to exert military infl uence on China’s maritime periphery, which 
contains several disputed zones of core strategic importance to Beijing. ASBMs 
are regarded as a means by which technologically limited developing countries 
can overcome by asymmetric means their qualitative inferiority in conventional 
combat platforms, because the gap between offense and defense is the greatest 
here.
Today, China may be closer than ever to attaining this capability. In addition 
to numerous outside reports suggesting Chinese efforts in this area, technical 
and operationally focused discussions on the topic are 
appearing in increasing numbers and in a widening 
array of Chinese sources, some clearly authoritative. 
This suggests that China may be close to testing and 
fi elding an ASBM system—a weapon that no other 
country currently possesses, since the United States 
relinquished a distantly related capability in 1988. In 
the view of Chinese and Western analysts, even the 
mere perception that China might have realized an 
ASBM capability could represent a paradigm shift, 
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with profound consequences for deterrence, military operations, arms control, 
and the balance of power in the western Pacifi c.
Although open sources do not claim that China currently has a proven ASBM 
capability, U.S. government sources have stated consistently that Beijing is de-
veloping an ASBM based on a variant of the land-based DF-21/CSS-5 medium-
range ballistic missile (MRBM). The DF-21’s 1,500-kilometer-plus range could 
hold ships at risk in a large maritime area, far beyond Taiwan and into the west-
ern Pacifi c.1 According to a 2006 unclassifi ed assessment by the U.S. Offi ce of 
Naval Intelligence, “China is equipping theater ballistic missiles [TBMs] with 
maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs) with radar or IR [infrared] seekers to 
provide the accuracy necessary to attack a ship at sea.”2 If viable, such missiles, 
with “high-reentry speed (Mach 10–12) [and] radical maneuvers,” would be ex-
traordinarily diffi cult to defend against, whatever ballistic missile defense the 
United States might deploy.3 Targeting a carrier with submunitions could enable 
China to render it operationally ineffective without sinking it, thereby achieving 
its objectives with a (perceived) lower risk of escalation. If not countered effec-
tively, the very impression of such a risk might deter carrier strike groups from 
entering the region in the fi rst place (fi gure 1).
FIGURE 1
MAXIMUM RANGE OF A DF-21/CSS-5 ASBM FROM LAUNCH LOCATIONS
IN MAINLAND CHINA
Note the large area potentially covered, far beyond Taiwan and the fi rst island chain into the western Pacifi c. This covers nearly all the maritime areas in which China has 
disputed claims, and provides a substantial strategic buffer zone for most. As published in Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic 
of China 2009, Annual Report to Congress, p. 29.
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China has also been working on a sophisticated network of ground- and 
space-based sensors, including over-the-horizon radars and electronic signals 
detection equipment. While fi nding an aircraft carrier has been likened to fi nd-
ing a needle in a haystack, this particular needle has a large radar cross section, 
emits radio waves, and is surrounded by airplanes. Simply looking for the big-
gest radar refl ection to target will tend to locate the largest ship—and the largest 
ship will usually be an aircraft carrier.4
While the ASBM issue has been discussed for nearly a decade in Chinese of-
fi cial reports and commentaries in various venues, it has only recently garnered 
widespread public attention in the United States, primarily in reaction to two 
Chinese articles;5 these articles were recently translated, posted, and analyzed 
on an infl uential blog affi liated with the U.S. Naval Institute, then covered wide-
ly by the media.6 But these articles represent merely the tip of a much larger ice-
berg. In what follows, we will survey open-source Chinese writings on ASBMs to 
investigate and assess Chinese views on developing, fi elding, and ultimately (in 
a worst-case scenario) using such a system.
EARLY CONCEPTIONS
For over three decades, Chinese leaders and strategists have been thinking of 
using land-based missiles to hit threatening targets at sea. In 1972, Vice Premier 
Zhang Chunqiao had signifi cant infl uence over China’s national decision mak-
ing as one of the Gang of Four, a faction led by Chairman Mao Zedong’s wife, 
Jiang Qing. In an important speech in April of that year he declared, “We are 
continentalists. Now guided missiles are well developed. Installed on shore, they 
can hit any target, and there is no need to build a big navy.”7 By focusing on a 
specifi c missile technology, as China had done so successfully since the 1950s, 
Zhang apparently believed, it would be possible to achieve a transformative stra-
tegic effect while devoting China’s limited resources to more pressing priori-
ties. Zhang’s political career did not survive Mao’s passing, and in the ensuing 
decades China took signifi cant steps toward building the “big navy” that Zhang 
decried. Meanwhile, however, ballistic missile development remained a key Chi-
nese focus. The American MaRVed Pershing II TBM—deployed in 1983—was 
studied intensively by the Chinese beginning in the late 1970s, with over fi fty 
related commentaries appearing on this subject.8 Such articles faded from more 
serious technical publications by the early 1990s, possibly because of the retire-
ment of the Pershing IIs following ratifi cation of the U.S.-Soviet Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in May 1988, as well as any efforts to avoid 
drawing attention to Chinese application of such technology. In any case, the 
Pershing II inspired Chinese research in this area and has been cited in Chinese 
sources as infl uencing the development of China’s family of ballistic missiles.9
3
Erickson and Yang: Using the Land to Control the Sea?—Chinese Analysts Consider the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
 56 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
In recent years, Beijing has sought to threaten credibly U.S. military access to 
strategically vital areas along China’s maritime periphery, particularly those sur-
rounding Taiwan. Despite progress toward this end, however, Chinese naval and 
maritime analysts have written consistently that their nation’s naval capabilities 
are still insuffi cient to address critical operational threats. Civilian leaders ap-
pear to have supported substantial naval development in keeping with China’s 
commercial maritime revolution but continue to prioritize national economic 
development over military expansion and wish to avoid emulating Soviet mis-
takes by devoting an unsustainable portion of national resources to the latter. 
For all these reasons, a widespread but targeted military modernization effort 
is under way that draws on earlier People’s Liberation Army (PLA) traditions of 
pursuing military objectives from a position of relative weakness. As part of this 
larger effort, a more balanced version of Zhang’s “vision” of ground-launched 
antiship missile development is apparently being pursued. What must be em-
phasized is that the idea of striking a ship from land is not new and that the idea 
of “using the land to control the sea” (以陆制海) in this way is very appealing to 
China, given its geostrategic situation.10
This effort has assumed new urgency as part of a larger effort to deter U.S. 
carrier strike groups from intervening in a potential confl ict over Taiwan. If 
China deploys a successful ASBM in the near future, rapid progress in its devel-
opment will be traced in part to the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, which further 
underscored Chinese feelings of helplessness against American naval power. 
The deployment of the USS Nimitz (CVN 68) and Independence (CV 62) car-
rier battle groups in response to Chinese missile tests and military exercises in 
the Taiwan Strait was a move that China could not counter.11 We cannot know 
at this time how the events of 1995–96 affected the precise calculations of Chi-
nese leaders, but they seem to have given a major boost to PLA development in 
general, and PLA Navy (PLAN) development in particular.12 Moreover, there is 
specifi c evidence that a new impetus was given to ASBM-related research and 
development at this time (fi gure 2). As Colonel Larry Wortzel (Ret.), U.S. Army 
attaché in Beijing from 1995 to 1997, recently testifi ed, “The fi rst time a senior 
Chinese military offi cer of the General Staff Department mentioned ballistic 
missiles attacking carriers was after our two carriers showed up, and he put his 
arm around my shoulder and said we’re going to sink your carriers with ballistic 
missiles, and we had a long conversation about it. I don’t know if they were doing 
research before that, but . . . the fi rst time it got thrown in my face was 1996.”13
DISCUSSIONS OF ASBMS IN THE CHINESE LITERATURE: AN OVERVIEW
Given the sensitivity of the issue, relevant statements on ASBM development by 
top Chinese leaders are currently lacking. But there are ample data to consider 
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at other levels. Chinese writings on ASBMs in the open-source literature can 
be divided into three broad categories. In descending level of authoritativeness, 
these include
1. PLA doctrinal publications describing how ASBMs might be used in opera-
 tional scenarios
2. Specialized technical analyses of specifi c aspects of such weapons and their
 supporting infrastructure
3. Generalist deliberations and didactic discussions on the technical and op-
 erational feasibility of such weapons.
The fi rst category comprises offi cial military doctrinal publications. These 
sources of guidance for PLA personnel illustrate how PLA analysts are thinking 
about using ASBMs in actual operational scenarios. They are typically written 
by leading scholars at institutions of professional military education, under the 
editorial guidance of high-ranking active-duty offi cers, or sometimes by retired 
offi cers themselves. Several doctrinal publications of the PLA as a whole and 
of the Second Artillery Corps (China’s strategic missile force) discuss a variety 
of ways in which to use conventional ballistic missiles to deter carrier strike 
FIGURE 2
CHINESE CONCEPTION OF ASBM TARGET DETECTION AND TRACKING, CA. 2000
Source: Chen Haidong et al., “Study of a Guidance Scheme for Reentry Vehicles Attacking Slowly Moving Targets,” p. 6, fi g. 1.
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groups (CSGs). This demonstrates that such a possibility is taken seriously by 
the PLA and suggests that relevant programs are under development, though it 
leaves unclear to what extent the PLA has mastered the necessary technical and 
operational capabilities.
The second category consists of focused technical analyses of specifi c sys-
tems and operations both explicitly and potentially relevant to ASBMs, such as 
calculations of the maneuvering range of reentry vehicles;14 another example is 
the suppression of sea-surface backscattering for maritime surveillance radars.15 
These are written by military and civilian technical analysts, whose names and 
institutions are typically identifi ed, for an audience in their relevant subfi elds. 
Compared to articles on other existing weapons systems (e.g., antiship cruise 
missiles [ASCMs]), these tend to be theoretical papers utilizing mathematical 
models, and it is not clear how readily they can be translated into concrete en-
gineering solutions. But some analysts claim that the theories involved have in-
deed been proved correct, and actual solutions may be contained in other docu-
ments. Together, these fi rst two categories of sources offer good indicators that 
China is pursuing ASBM development seriously; sophisticated intellectual work 
in doctrine and technology would underpin any such efforts.
The third category consists of generalist deliberations on the feasibility of 
such weapons. These are written by a variety of naval and maritime analysts 
(many unidentifi ed), for a broad range of military, defense industrial, and popu-
lar audiences, some perhaps for educational purposes. Tremendous disagree-
ment can be encountered in these sources, even on fundamental issues; they 
demonstrate a range of opinion and debate. More than a few contain technical 
errors and mistaken assumptions; many, however, offer very specifi c details.16 
The authoritativeness of these sources is frequently diffi cult to determine, al-
though many of the commentators are clearly technical experts.17
While there are clearly differences among the sources, then, it is important 
to note that areas exist that they all collectively treat as conventional wisdom, 
issues on which there is no disagreement regardless of forum, institutional af-
fi liation, or individual viewpoint. Chinese commentators agree that an ASBM, 
if it is to be developed, would be based on an upgraded version of an exist-
ing Chinese MRBM, such as the DF-21/CSS-5.18 A DF-21D variant is reportedly 
closest to an antiship version;19 some Chinese writings say this of the C version;20 
others refer to future modifi cations (e.g., a DF-21E).21 The prototype for such a 
weapon is generally held to be the Pershing II TBM; this is an unusual instance 
in which Chinese analysts do not see Russia as a model for weapons develop-
ment. At a strategic level, Chinese assessments generally concur that ASBMs, 
if realized in practice, would offer a variety of operational effects and value for 
Chinese maritime strategy—particularly vis-à-vis Taiwan. If this vision were 
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achieved, it could impose signifi cant restrictions on U.S. naval operations dur-
ing a Taiwan crisis, especially as there are complementary discussions in Chinese 
writings about holding U.S. theater land bases—such as those on Okinawa—at 
risk. Acknowledgment in Taiwan and the United States of such a change in the 
military balance, Chinese observers believe, would deter Taiwan independence 
and encourage cross-strait reintegration on Beijing’s terms. Finally, there is also 
general agreement as to which are the key technical challenges, including target 
acquisition and terminal guidance.22 To be sure, there is little discussion in the 
Chinese literature about specifi c Chinese capabilities in these areas, only general 
statements of feasibility and implicit assumptions in doctrinal publications that 
ASBMs are available for use or will be soon.
FIGURE 3
SIMILAR TECHNOLOGY? AMERICA’S PERSHING II AND CHINA’S DF-15/CSS-6 AND DF-21/
CSS-5 MISSILES
According to Chinese sources, a Chinese DF-21 ASBM would be based in part on the U.S. Pershing II (left), as is the DF-15 short-range ballistic missile (center). 
The U.S. Pershing II has adjustable control fi ns on its reentry vehicle for terminal maneuver. Positively identifi ed photos of a CSS-5 outside its launch canister 
are not known to exist. But the DF-15B missile pictured here has a reentry vehicle virtually identical to the Pershing II’s. Based on the strong visual resem-
blance, it is possible that the DF-15B employs terminal maneuvering technology similar to that of the Pershing II. The reentry vehicle that China obviously has 
here could easily be mated with a variant of the DF-21/CSS-5 booster (right), which might then produce an effective ASBM. (Photos used with permission 
from China Defense Forum)
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Doctrinal Sources
Apparently authoritative doctrinal writings already describe in some detail how 
ASBMs might be employed. Such references have been hitherto ignored in West-
ern scholarship; this is a case of potentially important information hiding in 
plain sight. There are volumes devoted to missions for the Second Artillery as 
part of PLA joint doctrine; the authors were unable to fi nd any doctrinal writ-
ings suggesting that other services (e.g., the PLAN) would be responsible for 
using conventional ballistic missiles to hit targets at sea.23
Three volumes deserve special scrutiny as perhaps the most authoritative 
writings available on PLA doctrine concerning the use of ballistic missiles in 
operational and tactical scenarios.24 Of these, The Science of Campaigns and 
The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns have each been “printed and distrib-
uted to all military forces, colleges, and universities as a training and learning 
reference.”25
The Science of Campaigns was written by researchers at China’s National De-
fense University. The 2006 edition, more sophisticated and joint in orientation 
than its 2000 predecessor, offers a basic overview of conditions under which 
conventional ballistic missiles might be used to “implement sea blockades” and 
“capture localized campaign sea dominance” by “implementing missile fi re-
power assault or fi repower harassment attacks against important targets that 
the enemy depends on for . . . sea-based maneuvering.” This would typically be 
done as part of a joint campaign with such organizations as the PLAN and the 
PLA Air Force, with which there is supposed to be “extremely close coordina-
tion,” although in unspecifi ed contingencies the Second Artillery might operate 
independently. Practical aspects, such as the imperative to “react rapidly” and 
“control the rate of missile consumption,” are emphasized to support a sophisti-
cated strategy aimed at “apply[ing] great psychological pressure on the enemy” 
and making him think “that no rules apply, thereby achieving the maximum 
effectiveness.”26
Even more relevant and sophisticated is The Science of Second Artillery Cam-
paigns. Published by the PLA Press in March 2004 (but completed in May 
2003), it likely serves as a high-level professional military education handbook 
for campaign-level command personnel in the Second Artillery and the PLA in 
general. Its chief editor and his deputy have considerable credibility and exper-
tise as top PLA offi cials. The foreword by the headquarters of the PLA General 
Staff further indicates that this book is the institutional position of the PLA as 
a whole and hence has been accepted by China’s civilian leadership, at least in 
general terms.27
How does the Second Artillery conceive of using ASBMs in operational sce-
narios? The 406-page document describes the use of ASBMs against carriers 
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in some detail and without suggesting that such an approach is aspirational or 
beset with insurmountable diffi culties. In fact, in introducing the section de-
scribing their potential employment, it states that “conventional missile strike 
groups” should be used as an “assassin’s mace” (or silver bullet)—a term com-
monly used in both PLA and less authoritative documents to describe weapons 
that match Chinese strengths with an enemy’s weaknesses.28
The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns states that the Second Artillery will 
work with the PLAN to “execute focused naval blockades” and “achieve com-
mand of the seas.”29 Approaching enemy CSGs are envisioned to be the principal 
maritime targets, but “large vessels or large ship formations” more broadly are 
mentioned as well.30 Coordination and precision are seen as essential for “deter-
ring and blocking enemy carrier strike groups”;31 such “operational activities 
need to be coordinated without the slightest difference in time.”32 Coordination 
with the PLAN is also emphasized in the location of sea targets, as well as with 
regard to the notifi cation and demarcation of blockade areas: “the naval intel-
ligence department should ‘relay promptly’ the information obtained by its re-
connaissance about enemy ship activities to the Second Artillery campaign large 
formation.”33 In particular, “information regarding carrier battle groups . . . should 
be gathered on a real time basis.”34 Potential sources of “real-time target intelli-
gence” include “military reconnaissance satellites, domestic and foreign remote 
sensing satellites, and established satellite reconnaissance target image informa-
tion processing systems.”35 While ASBMs are not mentioned explicitly in this 
context, the need for “further real-time intelligence on the dynamic target” to 
be obtained through “various measures and multiple channels” is recognized 
vis-à-vis cruise missiles.36
A two-page section describes fi ve ways to use ASBMs against carrier strike 
groups, a centerpiece of “military intervention by a powerful enemy” and thus 
the proper “focal point for attacks.”37 Such tactics as fi ring intimidation salvos, 
destroying shipborne aircraft with submunitions, or disabling with electromag-
netic pulses the sensor systems of Aegis destroyers are designed to make CSGs 
retreat or render them inoperable. More specifi cally, this passage of the Second 
Artillery doctrine describes
“Firepower harassment [strikes]” (• 火力袭扰), which involve hitting “carrier 
battle groups.”
“Frontal fi repower deterrence” (• 前方火力慑阻), which involves fi ring 
intimidation salvos in front of a CSG’s advance “to serve as a warning.”
“Flank fi repower expulsion” (• 翼侧火力驱赶), which combines interception 
of a CSG by PLAN forces with intimidation salvos “launched toward the 
9
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enemy carrier battle group opposite our relatively threatened fl ank” to force
 it away from the vulnerable area.
“Concentrated fi re assault” (• 集火突击), which entails targeting the carrier 
as a center of fl ight operations: “When many carrier-borne aircraft are used 
in continuous air strikes against our coast, in order to halt the powerful air 
raids, the enemy’s core carrier should be struck as with a ‘heavy hammer.’ 
The conventional missile forces should be a select group carrying sensitive 
penetrating submunitions and, using the ‘concentrated fi repower assault’ 
method, a wide-coverage strike against the enemy’s core carrier should be 
executed, striving to destroy the enemy’s carrier-borne planes, the control 
tower [island] and other easily damaged and vital positions.”
“Information assault” (• 信息攻击), which entails attacking the carrier strike 
group’s command and control system electromagnetically to disable it: 
“Directed against the enemy’s command and control system or weak links in 
the Aegis system, conventional missiles carrying antiradiation submunitions 
or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) submunitions can be used when enemy 
radar is being used and their command systems are working, with antiradia-
tion submunitions striking radar stations and EMP submunitions paralyzing 
the enemy’s command and control system.”38
A third document, Intimidation Warfare, edited by Lieutenant General Zhao 
Xijun, Second Artillery deputy commander from 1996 to 2003, echoes many 
of the statements on strategic signaling outlined in Science of Second Artillery 
Campaigns. It sheds additional light on China’s possible calculus and tactics in 
various scenarios. Zhao’s team emphasizes the value of demonstration training, 
tests, and other measures to infl uence the enemy, in part by infl uencing media 
coverage.39
Zhao’s team also suggests four methods to deter enemy ships without hitting 
them directly. “Proximity . . . sea deterrence strike” involves test launches that 
impact near a sea-based target. “Two-fl anked convergence proximity (or criti-
cal) deterrence strike [两翼夹击抵近 (临界) 威慑打击]” involves launching two 
or more missiles to bracket or encircle a target. “Island crossing attack deter-
rence strike [越岛攻击威慑打击]” exploits the psychological impact of missiles 
overfl ying “strategic targets” when fi ghting an enemy controlling an island (e.g., 
Taiwan?). “Proximity aircraft carrier deterrence strike [抵近航空威慑打击]” 
involves “the launching of missiles toward the fl anks or the front of the aircraft 
carrier battle groups that have entered one’s territorial waters, [to] demonstrate 
one’s ability and resolve to implement destructive strikes against the aircraft 
carrier, thereby producing psychological shocks in the enemy and forcing it to 
leave one’s territorial waters.”40
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Particularly noteworthy of the wide variety of uses suggested for ASBMs 
against carriers and possibly other surface vessels in this publication and in Sci-
ence of Second Artillery Campaigns is that at least several would appear to place 
less of a premium on warhead accuracy, depending on how literally such con-
cepts as bracketing and encirclement are interpreted. Rather, missile range and 
defense penetration capability would seem to be the key factors. If a MaRV were 
known to defeat terminal defenses and a demonstration shot defeated the SM-3 
interceptor,* only guidance failure would seem to stand in the way of a success-
ful Chinese strike.
Science of Second Artillery Campaigns states that TBMs extend the Second 
Artillery’s strike range, and it seems to assume that the Second Artillery would 
have ASBM inventory suffi cient to permit numerous warning shots. Horizontal 
escalation in the short run, it argues implicitly, can achieve de-escalation in the 
long run. Although the Second Artillery’s view is that such tactics would be ef-
fective, unless it were communicated effectively ahead of time that these were 
merely warning shots, they could easily be misinterpreted as failed attempts to 
strike the target and thus have the exact opposite result of China’s intent—that 
is, escalation instead of de-escalation. This potential problem is addressed, in 
a fashion, in Science of Second Artillery Campaigns: one section emphasizes the 
need for “no-fl y” and “restricted navigation zones” and calls for the use of “very 
precise missiles in order to prevent errors in precision or losing control of the 
missile when it is in fl ight such that it enters enemy territory (or an enemy-
occupied island), or such that it directly strikes an enemy aircraft carrier.” Oth-
erwise, such errors “could cause the nature of deterrence to change, giving the 
enemy an excuse to use force.”41
Technical Sources
Having considered how the Second Artillery thinks about using ASBMs, it is 
time to examine in detail possible approaches to, and technical challenges in, 
developing them. The Second Artillery dominates available technical ASBM as-
sessments, implying that it may largely control any Chinese ASBM programs. As 
the PLA’s strategic rocket force, with “equal attention devoted to” (and the vast 
majority of its recent acquisitions in) conventional forces, and 78.2 percent of its 
cadres now holding bachelor’s degrees or above, it would seem the logical choice 
to handle such a challenging new mission.42 The vast majority of available tech-
nical articles devoted explicitly to ASBM issues are authored in full or in part by 
individuals associated with the Second Artillery Engineering College in Xi’an, 
suggesting that this institution may be playing a major role in developing ASBM-
related programs. Technical analyses also come from civilian institutions in 
* The RIM-161 naval surface-launched anti–ballistic missile interceptor, a variant of the U.S. Navy’s Stand-
 ard Missile (SM) series.
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Xi’an, itself a major defense industry hub, as well, implying some division of 
intellectual labor.43 The most prolifi c contributor is the PLA-uniformed civilian 
Tan Shoulin, a leading professor at the Second Artillery Engineering College in 
the Department of Command and Support, who advises master’s students and 
specializes in “missile weapon fi repower applications.”
Second in institutional prominence is the Second Artillery Equipment De-
partment, in Beijing—with some related publication by the Second Artillery 
Equipment Research Institute as well. Such involvement may suggest that some 
degree of procurement, or at least active consideration thereof, is under way. 
Occasional participation can also be seen from individuals associated with units 
presumably associated with Second Artillery bases. Such strategic locations as 
Taiyuan, with its Military Representative Offi ce in Factory 247, also make ap-
pearances. Academic institutions in other places—such as the National Univer-
sity of Defense Science and Technology in Changsha and the Beijing Institute of 
Technology’s School of Aerospace Science and Engineering—appear to make 
contributions as well.
Chinese researchers are studying the problems of target tracking and termi-
nal guidance associated with ASBMs. Technical studies, such as a recent paper 
by State Oceanic Administration scientists on using synthetic-aperture radar to 
detect surface ships, suggest that the Chinese have developed substantial exper-
tise in the use of such hardware.44 A recent paper by researchers at Dalian Naval 
Academy offers a regimen of tests and data fusion to “achieve our goals of moni-
toring and identifying ships in large-scale sea areas by using space-borne optical 
sensors.”45 A study by researchers at Beijing Institute of Technology simulates 
terminal targeting of a moving aircraft carrier using adjoint equations and non-
dimensional analysis but states that guidance precision-enhancing technologies 
still need to be developed.46 A mathematical study by researchers at the Second 
Artillery Engineering College appears designed to demonstrate conceptual fea-
sibility.47 Researchers at the Second Artillery Engineering College and Second 
Artillery Base 55, Unit 96311, Huaihua (Jingzhou), offer a theoretical explora-
tion of the ability of TBMs with terminal-phase guidance and maneuvering ca-
pabilities to attack aircraft carriers.48
Researchers at the Second Artillery Engineering College and the National 
Defense Science and Technology University offer a mathematical model of a 
type of terminal guidance, based on a prediction model of a carrier’s movement. 
Modeling suggests that this method can allow warhead precision to achieve a 
CEP* of about twelve meters under the most ideal conditions.49
* Circular error probability—broadly, the distance from an aim point within which a missile has a 50 percent
  probability of striking.
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In a related paper, researchers at the Second Artillery Engineering College 
and the Second Artillery Equipment Department present a model for predicting 
the movement of a CSG that can provide targeting information for land-based 
TBMs. For the needs of TBM targeting, it would be suffi cient to provide predic-
tions with a precision measured in kilometers within a time frame of “tens of 
minutes.” The paper demonstrates the feasibility of such a forecast system and 
provides two maps depicting the notional location of an aircraft carrier south-
southeast of Taiwan, at the latitude of Hainan Island.50
How to cause maximum damage to a carrier most effectively is another com-
mon research topic.51 For example, a PhD and a master’s student at the Second 
Artillery Engineering College offer a theoretical model for calculating damage 
effects on large targets with many components—say, a carrier strike group.52 
The discussions in a large proportion of technical articles focus on the delivery 
of submunitions by homing ballistic missiles to disable fl ight operations from 
carriers, while not addressing directly the problems of target acquisition and 
guidance. Research on submunitions appears to be extremely widespread and 
sophisticated, with many writings on how to use them against carrier-based 
aircraft and against runways at air bases (e.g., those of Taiwan). A pathbreak-
ing U.S. article by William S. Murray provides compelling evidence that the 
Second Artillery has already developed considerable competence in the latter 
mission.53
Defeating U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) is also seen by many Chinese 
researchers as essential to attacking a carrier strike group successfully, and it has 
attracted considerable study.54 Researchers at the Second Artillery Engineering 
College offer a theoretical model of reentry-vehicle maneuvering using “moving 
mass center” control methods. This involves changing the center of gravity of 
a warhead by adjusting movable masses within the warhead, thereby modify-
ing its atmospheric fl ight path. The aerodynamic profi le of the warhead would 
remain unchanged, and the method can be used in conjunction with fi ns and 
other conventional control surfaces.55
Technical experts working on technical solutions are focused on very nar-
row, specifi c issues. One wonders, however, whether their political leaders have 
“gamed out” the scenarios and considered the consequences as technical ca-
pabilities progress. The danger with a lopsided focus is that without a proper 
understanding of the potential strategic risks involved, technical achievements 
can have dangerous consequences. According to some interpretations, China’s 
11 January 2007 antisatellite test offers a cautionary example of Beijing’s civilian 
leadership approving the trial of a weapon long in development without under-
standing fully its scope or strategic ramifi cations.56
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Whatever the exact strategic calculations (or lack thereof) of the political 
leadership (authoritative sources are silent on the point), the ASBM issue has 
been vigorously debated by Chinese commentators in various unoffi cial venues. 
Some of these individuals may be privy to internal deliberations or even play 
roles in shaping policy, particularly in specialized subject areas. When politics 
or bureaucratic maneuvering comes to the fore, they may become caught up in 
larger competitions of ideas. But even the views of those not directly involved in 
the policy process often matter; their ideas may inform policy makers directly 
or even be adopted. Some analyses may well be informed by parallel debates in 
offi cial circles, and even be designed to help justify or “socialize” already estab-
lished policies—for instance, through didactic exploration of important con-
cepts. For that, we turn to the generalist literature.
Generalist Literature
Though, as we have seen, the doctrinal literature is the most demonstrably 
authoritative category of open-source writings, with technical literature often 
roughly equivalent, care must be taken in extrapolating actual capabilities from 
these sources. Available Second Artillery technical articles and mathematical 
feasibility studies devoted explicitly to ASBM issues do not detail concrete Chi-
nese capabilities.57 Even doctrine may refl ect aspirations or projected capabili-
ties rather than the existence of hardware and infrastructure. In fact, Chinese 
doctrinal publications often discuss theoretical capabilities as if they existed, 
which U.S. joint publications typically do not.
For all these reasons, it is useful to examine the less clearly authoritative but 
more diverse and detailed generalist literature, with its widespread debate on all 
major aspects of ASBM development and employment, for indications of chal-
lenges and dilemmas that China might face. Regardless of the actual status of 
Chinese ASBM development, these opinions matter: perfecting and deploying 
such a weapon would entail resolving a wide variety of complexities and policy 
considerations and transcending many industrial and bureaucratic boundaries. 
Any remaining challenges in the technical data fusion required for ASBM guid-
ance and targeting may pale in comparison to the bureaucratic “data fusion” 
needed if such a program is to succeed over time and such a weapon is to func-
tion effectively in combat.58
Strategic Rationale and Scenarios. There is broad (though not complete) consisten-
cy in the generalist literature concerning the operational effects of ASBMs and their 
potential value for Chinese maritime strategy writ large. Antiship ballistic missiles 
are promoted as a means to overcome conventional inferiority (by exploiting tech-
nological asymmetry), deter intervention, give China more maneuvering space, and 
offer both escalation control and an “assassin’s mace” for victory if deterrence fails.
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Of supreme importance to Beijing is Taiwan’s political status. At the strate-
gic level, Beijing seeks to deter Taipei from declaring independence, progres-
sively constrain its political space, and encourage eventual reunifi cation, with a 
wide variety of hard- and soft-power tools. Tactical ballistic missiles are thought 
by one analyst to offer China a “third” alternative to the risk of engaging in 
outright attack, on one hand, and the limitations of soft power, on the other. 
Termed “attacking without entering,” a TBM campaign is seen by this observer 
as increasing China’s strategic options while limiting Taiwan’s.59 In addition to 
their psychological and deterrent effects, ASBMs (as a category of tactical bal-
listic missiles) are believed to offer China a way to exert hard-power pressure 
and convey strategic signals in scenarios that do not rise to the level of war. This 
would seem in concert with Chinese strategic writings, which often express con-
siderable confi dence that China can manage strategic escalation in measured 
increments with a high degree of certainty. At the operational level, facing the 
possibility of intervention by a technologically more advanced navy in the event 
of a Taiwan confl ict, the PLA seeks an asymmetric “silver bullet” that will (ide-
ally) forestall intervention in the fi rst place or, in a worst-case scenario, offer the 
ability to attack platforms that are perceived to threaten China. Antiship ballis-
tic missiles promise to further this strategy at far lower cost than force-on-force 
approaches. Three PLA offi cers from the Second Artillery Command College 
declare that “guided missile forces are the silver bullet for achieving victory in 
limited high-technology war.”60
A professor and a student at the Air Force Engineering Academy evoke an 
analogous concept when they write that ballistic missiles enjoy a higher proba-
bility of penetration than other antiaccess weapons: “Tactical ballistic missiles” 
have become “the ‘poor country’s atom bomb.’”61
In addition, TBMs are regarded by their proponents as an important instru-
ment in China’s overall strategic tool kit. One of the most nuanced analyses on 
the issue, an article published in the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation 
(CSIC) journal Shipborne Weapons, states that tactical missiles “provide China 
with more maneuvering space for military and political strategic operations on 
its eastern, maritime fl ank.”62 More specifi cally, the creation of a
tactical ballistic missile maritime strike system . . . will establish for China in any 
high-intensity confl ict in its coastal waters an asymmetry, in its favor, in the deliv-
erance of fi repower and so will remedy to some extent China’s qualitative inferior-
ity in traditional naval platforms. Further, the existence of this asymmetry would 
set up for both sides a psychological “upper limit” on the scale of confl ict. This 
would enable both parties to return more easily “to rationality,” thereby creating 
more space for maneuver in the resolution of maritime confl icts.63
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Skeptics writing in another CSIC publication, Modern Ships, by contrast, re-
ject both of these points, arguing that ASBMs offer limited power-projection 
capabilities, are highly escalatory if employed, and might in fact trigger nuclear 
retaliation.64
How Chinese strategists assess the impact of ASBMs for various confl ict sce-
narios is far more diffi cult to evaluate. Few articles address this topic. One that 
does states that “the PLA must use all of its electronic warfare and reconnais-
sance assets properly, must neutralize enemy antimissile systems and missile 
sensor systems, and should use electronic jamming on the enemy fl eet. Such 
combined kinetic and electronic attacks help the PLA attack an enemy fl eet . . . 
with a combination of explosive, antiradiation, and fake warheads to deceive 
enemy radar and sensor systems and defeat a deployed battle group or one in 
port.”65
A 2007 article offers a minutely detailed scenario of a notional attack se-
quence. But it is divorced from larger strategic events, based on some question-
able assumptions, and written by a journalist with no professional background 
in defense affairs.66 No known sources mention directly any scenarios beyond 
Taiwan.
In any case, the concept hinges on technical feasibility (the subject of the 
next section of this article). Chinese discussions of ASBM employment typically 
center on their use to deny U.S. carrier strike groups access to waters relevant to 
a Taiwan confl ict, presumably to the east of the island, and hence to the airspace 
over the strait and even over the island itself. The idea seems to be to hold carri-
ers back through deterrence and to attack them if they come forward.
At the same time, ASBMs are recognized to have signifi cant limitations, even 
potential dangers. According to one analyst, they “cannot replace aircraft car-
riers, submarines, and other traditional naval weapons”: they “can be used to 
destroy enemy forces at sea but not to achieve absolute sea control, let alone to 
project maritime power.”67 Two writers in Modern Ships go much farther, declar-
ing that while ASBMs are technically possible, their employment in practice is 
fraught with diffi culties. These can be overcome, in their view, if one is dealing 
with a minor power, but not with a superpower like the United States.68 One 
claim they make, as have others, is that reducing the speed of the warhead in 
the terminal reentry phase in order to operate its guidance radar makes it more 
vulnerable to anti–ballistic missile interceptors. To some extent this depends 
on one’s assessment of the maneuverability of the warhead in its terminal entry 
phase, but the authors of the Modern Ships article are highly skeptical. They 
acknowledge that the problem may be overcome to some extent in a saturated 
attack, but they insist that the Aegis defense system is designed to deal with just 
that. They also point to the relatively high costs of ballistic missiles. Further, 
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they suggest that the use of ballistic missiles in a saturation attack would “likely 
lead to the scenario described by ancient Chinese strategists, in which the weap-
on in question becomes unusable in practice” because its use would be highly 
escalatory: “Apply little force, and no real harm can be done to the enemy; apply 
great force, and the fi rst harm is done to the self.”69
Even if ASBMs were indeed successfully developed, by virtue of an over-
whelming investment of resources and energy, the Modern Ships authors con-
tend, a critical problem would remain: whether anyone would dare use such 
weapons in an actual confl ict scenario.70 The authors seem to suggest that while 
conventional tactical missiles could be used against Taiwan with little risk, 
their employment against U.S. carriers would immediately create a grave politi-
cal problem: “Since the introduction of nuclear weapons, all the major nuclear 
powers have developed ballistic missile warning systems against possible nucle-
ar attacks, and there has not been a single precedent of a major nuclear power 
attacking another with ballistic missiles.”71 As no technology today is capable of 
distinguishing between a conventional and a nuclear warhead prior to detona-
tion upon impact, the authors worry that any ballistic-missile attack against 
another nuclear power might activate its strategic retaliation mechanisms and 
trigger a nuclear confl ict. The Modern Ships authors emphasize that in any con-
fl ict scenario, the extreme psychological duress to which the military personnel 
of both sides would be subjected would make it particularly dangerous to em-
ploy ballistic missiles, as any small mistake in judgment might trigger a nuclear 
Armageddon.72 Even absent any misperception, sinking a ship that is a symbol 
of American power and has a crew of thousands could provoke a very serious 
response. Of course, elements of the PLA, and even their civilian leaders in a cri-
sis, might be less cautious than these analysts. Another writer, having reviewed 
their performance in battle since the 1960s, concludes that TBMs are indeed, as 
others have argued, an “assassin’s mace,” a silver bullet.73 A Chinese interlocutor 
has told one of the present authors that the Second Artillery is itself considering 
placing nuclear and conventional warheads interchangeably on the same types 
of missiles—for example, the DF-21—so that they will “possess both nuclear 
and conventional [核常兼备]” capabilities. This last may be evidence of open 
debate, of manipulation of American opinion, or of sensitization of the United 
States to operational implications. If the latter, there is a clear risk of mispercep-
tions in the event of launch in a confl ict.
The question of operational control is not addressed directly in the open 
sources, but the content of doctrinal publications, the large number of Second 
Artillery offi cers writing on the topic, and the current responsibility of that arm 
for the vast majority of nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles suggest that 
the Second Artillery is likely to have sole responsibility for ground-based ASBMs. 
17
Erickson and Yang: Using the Land to Control the Sea?—Chinese Analysts Consider the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
 70 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
(The possibility of rivalry and divergence of viewpoints that may result between 
the Second Artillery and the PLAN will be addressed later in this article.)
Technological Feasibility: Convergence and Divergence of Views. Chinese doc-
trinal debates about the utility of ASBMs are closely related to widespread dis-
agreements over their technical feasibility. Analysts generally concur that fi ve 
major technical challenges must be surmounted to achieve a functioning ASBM: 
detection, tracking, penetration of target defenses, hitting a moving target, and 
causing suffi cient damage (fi gure 4).
Detection: Pessimists claim that carriers are too small relative to the potential 
search area to be easily detected by satellite images. Optimists maintain that 
carriers—with their broad constellation of electromagnetic signals—can be de-
tected in a variety of ways, such as with space-borne sensors.
Tracking: Skeptics maintain that requisite satellite coverage is unattainable, 
as are suffi cient naval vessels and surveillance craft, as well as overseas bases 
for signals intelligence. They believe that China’s other tracking methods are 
inadequate, even in aggregate. Strangely, they seem to overlook the possibility 
that China’s combination of land-based radars and satellites—perhaps aug-
mented temporarily with deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles and launches 
of (micro)satellites—might be suffi cient to track and target carrier strike groups 
within a certain zone off China’s coastal waters from which it believed essential 
Trajectory at 
launch site
Apogee of missile 
flight trajectory
Point of impact with 
initial guidance 
(location of the 
aircraft carrier when 
the missile was 
launched)
Point to vary trajectory in 
mid segment
Terminal guidance
Point of missile 
without terminal 
guidance (location 
of the aircraft carrier 




Target point (current 
location of aircraft 
carrier)
FIGURE 4
SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF ASBM FLIGHT TRAJECTORY WITH MIDCOURSE AND TERMINAL 
GUIDANCE
Note the depiction of control fi ns on the reentry vehicle, which would be critical to steering the ASBM through terminal maneuvers to evade countermeasures 
and home in on a moving target. This makes an ASBM different from most ballistic missiles, which have a fi xed trajectory. Published by individuals affi liated 
with the Second Artillery Engineering College and a Second Artillery base in a Chinese technical journal.
Source: Tan Shoulin, Zhang Daqiao, and Diao Guoxiu, “Determination and Evaluation of Effective Range for Terminal Guidance Ballistic Missile(s) Attacking 
Aircraft Carrier(s),” pp. 6–9, republished in Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009, Annual Report to 
Congress, p. 21.
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to exclude them in combat.74 Both Chinese and Western sources, for instance, 
suggest that China already has relevant over-the-horizon (OTH) backscatter 
sky-wave and OTH surface-wave radars.75
Target defense penetration: The claims of skeptics that slowing the warhead 
for terminal guidance makes it prohibitively vulnerable to interception seem 
unpersuasive based on known physics principles. A wide variety of Chinese 
sources suggest using multiaxis saturation attacks (e.g., involving submarine-
launched cruise missiles as well) to overwhelm CSG defenses, apparently with-
out acknowledging the diffi culty of coordinating them.
Hitting a moving target: How to strike a CSG that moves during the processes 
of location, data transmission, and ASBM delivery? Skeptics contend that bal-
listic missiles are less accurate than cruise missiles and that while a ballistic 
missile’s trajectory is fi xed, its target is mobile and may escape between launch 
and impact. But researchers at the Second Artillery Engineering College main-
tain that as long as the initial ASBM trajectory is reasonably accurate, appro-
priate homing corrections can be made. Other researchers suggest improving 
precision with passive radiation homing and by activating terminal guidance at 
higher altitude to allow the seeker to scan a larger sea area. One researcher rec-
ommends selecting opportune moments for attack: “Even a tiger takes a nap [老
虎也有打盹的时候].”76 Thus, they contend, carriers can be targeted when fl ight 
operations or at-sea replenishment impede their mobility.
Causing suffi cient damage: While a few experts make a show of detailing car-
rier damage-control equipment, one wonders from their tone if they are not 
being a bit disingenuous. The conventional wisdom seems to be that a multiaxis 
saturation attack (to defeat defenses) or submunitions (to distribute damage), 
delivered accurately, can achieve a mission kill by targeting critical exposed ar-
eas, such as the carrier’s aircraft, island, or C4ISR* equipment.
ASSESSMENTS
Available Chinese literature follows a logical pattern of ever-widening concen-
tric circles of awareness and, to a lesser extent, involvement. This supports the 
axiom that the longer something goes on, the more likely people are to hear 
about it. At the center, authoritative PLA publications assume an (eventual?) 
ASBM capability. Farther out, a variety of institutes are working to validate spe-
cifi c concepts and perhaps also technologies to support such a capability. Be-
yond these inner circles, a wide range of individuals, whose access to internal 
information probably varies markedly, are beginning to weigh in with diverse 
opinions and institutional interests. Few writers in the generalist literature make 
a balanced, nonpartisan argument along the lines that ASBMs are feasible but 
* Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
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a bad idea or a good idea but technically infeasible. This suggests a general pat-
tern of institutional biases and competition, with individuals favoring precisely 
the outcomes that would benefi t their organizations most. These opinions and 
interests matter. Many of the projections of technological “hurdles” outlined 
above are either demonstrably pessimistic or will likely be obviated anyway over 
the next few years as China continues its rapid aerospace development. Rather, 
China’s ASBM future may be a policy, not a technical, question. For now, as ca-
pabilities are being developed, technical discussion is being elevated to strategic 
discussion, but that could well change if Beijing’s leaders ask one day: Now that 
we have an ASBM capability, what can we do with it?
Nonetheless, debate continues in China’s generalist literature over the techni-
cal feasibility of ASBM operations, with only two writers claiming directly that 
China has ASBM capabilities.77 This may suggest that there is ongoing disagree-
ment in China concerning how to develop these weapons at present and how 
they could best be placed into operation. Now that China has what could be 
termed a public and military-intellectual complex, organizations, analysts and 
policy entrepreneurs may be jockeying for position in an attempt to infl uence 
the course of decision making on the part of at least two of China’s armed ser-
vices, its military leadership, and ultimately its civilian authorities.
The overall discussion seen so far is best characterized as “contentious.” The 
three technical challenges most consistently emphasized are real-time satellite 
reconnaissance, target tracking in terminal reentry, and terminal maneuvering. 
Some problems that are presented as insurmountable by some analysts are ap-
proached more sanguinely by others. Foreign subject-matter experts could glean 
signifi cant insights from the multitude of relevant Chinese technical studies.
Particularly noteworthy is that direct claims of existing Chinese capabilities 
in these areas are extremely limited. In other words, the focus of the discus-
sion is on feasibility rather than actual Chinese capabilities. Researchers at the 
Second Artillery Engineering College make a variety of feasibility claims, in 
one instance stating specifi cally that the technical hurdles to successful ASBM 
employment have already been resolved, but they cite English-language techni-
cal papers as authority for this particular point (though they use sophisticated 
Chinese sources to support other details of their argument).78 Again, they em-
phasize technical feasibility without reference to current Chinese capabilities. It 
is likely that some Chinese authors do not know what those capabilities actually 
are, while others cannot say.
Several other issues, though not directly addressed by the Chinese authors 
surveyed, may merit further attention.
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Possible Interservice Rivalry
A noticeable pattern in the tone of ASBM analyses may be interpreted as signs 
of Second Artillery–PLAN bureaucratic competition. Momentum, direction, 
and contention about programs may refl ect diverse institutional interests. The 
Second Artillery produces many technical analyses, but not a single one appears 
pessimistic. Articles written by analysts and students associated with the Second 
Artillery tend to take the feasibility of ASBM development for granted, perhaps 
because an ASBM program would be (or now is) controlled by the Second Artil-
lery, thereby furthering its institutional interests.
By contrast, the vast majority of analyses affi liated with the PLAN and the 
state shipbuilding industry suggest that ASBM development is technically prob-
lematic or that use would have dangerous unintended consequences.79 Perhaps 
this is because ground-launched ASBMs would not be controlled by the navy 
and could divert resources otherwise earmarked for naval development. The 
PLAN may also be lobbying hard to begin serious aircraft carrier development 
of its own and does not want this effort undermined by constant emphasis on 
carrier vulnerabilities—which have played a major role in previous Chinese car-
rier discussions, at least at the generalist level. We may thus be witnessing some 
elements of Chinese bureaucratic resource-allocation politics, cloaked in strate-
gic debate and the fl ag.
In an interesting suggestion of at least some cooperation between the Second 
Artillery and the PLAN on antiship ballistic missiles, however, an individual 
from the Navy Representative Offi ce in Chengdu, Sichuan, is a coauthor with re-
searchers from the Second Artillery Engineering College on two ASBM-specifi c 
articles. This is precisely the sort of interaction that one would expect if the 
Second Artillery were charged with directly developing and testing an ASBM, 
in which case the PLAN would second representatives to relevant Second Ar-
tillery facilities to make sure that weapons produced addressed PLAN needs.80 
Moreover, such PLAN-affi liated institutions as the Dalian Naval Academy and 
the State Oceanographic Administration conduct extensive research on related 
topics like ship detection and tracking.
Pressing questions remain, however. What role would the PLAN play in op-
erations that clearly affect its geographic area of responsibility? How would 
joint operations be coordinated among the Second Artillery, the PLAN, and 
other services—particularly given the PLA’s previous limited ability in joint 
operations?
Cost-Effectiveness
Beijing’s actual development and deployment of ASBMs, and implications for 
any bureaucratic competition between the Second Artillery and the PLAN, will 
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also hinge on decision makers’ perceptions of their relative effi cacy and cost-
effectiveness (e.g., vis-à-vis cruise missiles), as well as their marginal develop-
ment cost. The relative cost-effectiveness of various antiaccess weapons can be 
derived from both physical principles and Western and Soviet experience, both 
of which have been widely discussed in open literature.
Many Chinese analysts have regarded such traditional weapons as attack sub-
marines and antiship cruise missiles as the primary weapons against carriers, 
with no more than cursory references to ASBMs. Other Chinese sources claim 
that cruise missiles are superior to ballistic missiles for certain missions, par-
ticularly in terms of general use, agility, and target selection. According to the 
U.S. defense analyst Thomas Mahnken, cruise missiles have many advantages 
over ballistic missiles for a country like China: they are cheaper, it is easier to 
make them highly accurate, they require simpler launch platforms and support 
equipment, and they “approach their targets from different azimuths than bal-
listic missiles [and] hug the ground.”81 Further, cruise missiles can be delivered 
by aircraft, as well as by ships, submarines, and ground launchers.
ASBM advocates make several strong points, however. Cruise missiles have 
a variety of disadvantages, including the much longer time of fl ight (with obvi-
ous targeting implications); the need to fl y long ranges at high altitudes, where 
they are much more vulnerable to being shot down; conversely, low operational 
ceilings at long ranges (thus making it harder to fl y over mountains, such as Tai-
wan’s); shorter maximum ranges than ballistic missiles; and diffi culty in identi-
fying targets correctly. In an interesting example of PLAN-affi liated individuals 
claiming that ASBMs have advantages, researchers from the Naval Aeronautical 
Engineering Academy use mathematical analysis to calculate that “when using 
ballistic missiles to carry out attack operations on [naval vessel formations], the 
probability of penetration can reach 95%.” This is a much higher success rate 
than those they calculate for cruise missiles.82
Antiship cruise missiles must often be fi red from aircraft, surface vessels, 
or submarines that approach close to enemy forces to compensate for reduced 
range. This, and their relatively long fl ight times, increases their vulnerability 
(albeit less so for submarine launches), and hence also their cost. However, the 
ASCM shooters themselves are not necessarily more expensive just because they 
are vulnerable and might be lost in combat; some (e.g., the Type 022 Houbei 
missile catamaran) are likely considered disposable, with loss in combat as-
sumed. A mobile land-based ASBM, though requiring substantial development 
and infrastructure investment, would be much less vulnerable to destruction 
before launch. Two Chinese observers estimate the unit cost of an ASBM and its 
launcher to be $5–$10.5 million—several times that of the most expensive U.S. 
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cruise missiles if their launch platform is not included, but far less than the cost 
of interceptors to defeat it.83
Other Chinese authors have addressed the cost-effectiveness issue only in 
passing. One analyst insists that cost-effectiveness should not be understood 
along conventional lines in such confl ict scenarios and that if the technology 
is indeed feasible, the cost issue will not necessarily be so salient.84 The discus-
sion is often interwoven with analyses of which weapons can best target aircraft 
carriers. Here, the primary comparison is between ASBMs and cruise missiles. 
One analyst states that “ballistic missiles, given the same tactical parameters, 
offer more outstanding penetration capability and cost-effectiveness than cruise 
missiles,” both of which are superior to aircraft in this regard.85 This assess-
ment is augmented by another observer, who states that “supersonic antiship 
guided missiles that use ramjet engines are not very useful due to their restricted 
ranges.” Moreover, “it will be very diffi cult to surpass or even catch up to the 
United States and Russia in developing cruise missiles. Thus, it will be very dif-
fi cult for our cruise missiles to become a deadly weapon to carry out fatal attacks 
against aircraft carrier formations.”86 Chinese planners may therefore favor de-
velopment of ASBMs as a means of “poor man’s sea denial,” over such complex, 
expensive approaches as a fl eet of aircraft carriers and accompanying long-range 
aircraft.87
A Coercive Quarantine?
Synthesizing the considerations above, it is possible that to the extent that tacti-
cal ballistic missiles are employed as antiship weapons, they would most likely 
be used as part of a multiservice combined-arms operation, as an added compo-
nent of a saturation attack to overwhelm the carrier’s defensive systems. For this 
purpose, targeting precision would not be as important, and the more general 
Chinese tradition of numbers over accuracy could be employed to good effect. 
While coordinating such an attack would be complex and diffi cult, there could 
be signifi cant benefi ts if such issues could be surmounted. If a carrier detected 
an incoming ballistic missile, it would likely engage it with its air-defense assets 
regardless of the attacking missile’s presumed accuracy. This could divert car-
rier defense systems from other threats, such as other ASBMs or simultaneous 
cruise missile volleys, and perhaps exhaust scarce interceptors. To escape this 
problem, carriers may opt to stay out of the range of the TBMs. As one analyst 
writing in the Kanwa Asian Defense Review puts it, “For the Chinese military 
forces, the practical signifi cance of striking the aircraft carrier lies in that the 
attacks can play the role of ‘coercive [quarantine]’ even if the missiles cannot 
[always] accurately hit the targets, that is, to keep the U.S. aircraft carrier battle 
groups out of the Taiwan Strait combat theater.”88
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Messages for the U.S. Military?
How and to what extent might Beijing be seeking to infl uence strategic communi-
cations regarding ASBMs? Information manipulation should certainly be expect-
ed; discussion is likely regulated to send a desired signal. This is in keeping with 
the attention to deception and perception management outlined in a variety of 
PLA publications, including Science of Second Artillery Campaigns.89 Within such 
a conception, different explanations for Chinese writings on ASBMs are possible; 
to the extent that they are manipulated, they could represent, respectively, a highly 
cost-effective partial deterrent until the capability is fully realized, a refl ection of 
ongoing ambivalence and debate, a targeted effort to obscure actual capabilities, 
or a statement of conditional intent.
Strategic articles might well be manipulated to obscure or divert attention 
from an extant capability or one in rapid development. Consider the sheer vol-
ume of highly specifi c Chinese technical writings from a wide variety of im-
portant civilian and military institutes over the past decade—seemingly on all 
areas of direct relevance to ASBM development and even use—virtually all of 
them stating that various component capabilities are either under development 
or at least technically feasible. Manipulating a few strategic articles in journals 
known to be read outside China, by comparison, might be a particularly effec-
tive instrument in an information campaign. It is even possible that there is an 
effort to send a measured signal—that China may be preparing certain capa-
bilities but has not yet made defi nitive plans for their deployment, the actual 
realization of which will be calibrated in response to American strategic actions 
(e.g., vis-à-vis Taiwan).
In any case, should its capabilities be developed suffi ciently, Beijing might 
emulate former Second Artillery deputy commander Lieutenant General Zhao 
Xijun’s logic and reveal a dramatic weapon test to the world—with or with-
out advance warning—in some way geared to infl uencing offi cial and public 
opinion in the United States, Taiwan, and Japan. Such an unprecedented public 
demonstration could be used to signal either growing Chinese power during a 
time of stability or Beijing’s resolve in a time of diplomatic tension or crisis.90 
Alternatively, unpublicized fl ight tests could be conducted to deter foreign mili-
taries without alarming foreign publics (though classifi ed information might 
ultimately be leaked to them).
In any case, some sort of fl ight tests would be necessary to generate Chinese 
confi dence in ASBM capabilities. The fact of a hit, however manipulated and 
revealed, could change the strategic equation—much as the effi cacy of the 20–21 
July 1921 test-bombing of the battleship Ostfriesland was hotly contested by the 
U.S. Navy (and remains debated to this day) yet altered service budgets imme-
diately and helped catalyze development of what later became the U.S. Air Force. 
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Is there today a Chinese equivalent of Brigadier General Billy Mitchell eager to 
promote such a test to further the cause of Second Artillery and China’s pioneer-
ing of new ways of war?
However the Chinese internal debate on ASBM development progresses, the 
strategic stakes will be high; this will be a debate worth following.
IMPLICATIONS
While there is ongoing disagreement as to their feasibility and effi cacy, the idea of 
developing antiship ballistic missiles is clearly appealing to many in China, par-
ticularly in the Second Artillery. Any successful Chinese deployment of ASBMs 
would likely infl uence PLA thinking by
Reinforcing continental approaches to maritime security—“using the land to •
control the sea”
Reinforcing centralized approaches to command•
Increasing emphasis on multiaxis saturation attacks•
Increasing confi dence in China’s ability to restrict U.S. Navy operations, and •
to control escalation.
All does not hinge on putative ASBM capability: demonstration of other an-
tiaccess capabilities (e.g., streaming antiship cruise missile attacks) that a tech-
nologically capable nation like China is clearly capable of mastering could have 
substantial effect. But ASBMs pose a threat qualitatively different from that of 
antiship cruise missiles: the United States has not had decades to address the 
problem, interception is far more complex and time sensitive, and launch plat-
forms cannot be targeted (“shooting the archer instead of the arrow”) without 
contemplating highly escalatory strikes in mainland China.
Chinese leaders do not seek war. Rather, they want to defend what they per-
ceive to be their nation’s core territorial interests and to ensure a stable environ-
ment for domestic economic development. If they develop an ASBM, then, they 
would likely hope that it could prevent U.S. projection of military power in ways 
that were inimical to China’s interests. They would thus hope to achieve deter-
rence without going to war. That said, America has its own national interests, in-
cluding maintaining freedom of navigation, reassuring such key regional allies 
as Japan and South Korea, preserving peace in the Taiwan Strait, and safeguard-
ing Taiwan’s democracy. A demonstrated Chinese ASBM capability, particularly 
if the Chinese side failed to offer explanations and reassurances, could threaten 
these interests and be strategically destabilizing. This would necessitate Ameri-
can development and demonstration of robust countermeasures that Beijing 
would come to regret.91
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Herein lies one more way in which Chinese open-source discussions of ASBMs 
are signifi cant, and must be addressed. Chinese public intellectuals are often 
tasked by their government with making unoffi cial statements to gauge inter-
national response to potential initiatives, as was the case in December 2008 be-
fore a far more positive historic fi rst—the PLAN’s counterpiracy deployment to 
the Gulf of Aden. If some Chinese are currently sending such “trial balloons” 
with regard to ASBM development, but U.S. interlocutors appear to be unaware, 
distracted, or indifferent, this will only strengthen the hand of those pushing 
such programs forward. Measured expression of U.S. concern, resolve, and ca-
pability, on the other hand, might infl uence Chinese decision-making regarding 
ASBM development in a more positive direction—for example, by informing 
and empowering the voices of government organizations with more to lose than 
the Second Artillery in provoking the United States—or at least slow the pace to 
give time for a more measured reaction. Just as American policy makers must 
now discuss how best to prepare for this potential capability, they should work 
to ensure that their Chinese counterparts have an analogous policy debate—in 
parallel to the ongoing debate in open sources regarding whether China should 
develop and deploy an ASBM, and the doctrinal and usage implications if it 
does. While China will ultimately keep its own counsel, like any nation, such 
efforts should at least ensure that any decisions in favor of ASBM development 
are made with full awareness of the contingent costs, risks, and consequences. 
To facilitate this process, two areas require particular investment of political 
and human capital:
Increased research to understand the trajectory of both Chinese ASBM •
efforts and the attendant policy discourse92
Bilateral strategic dialogue at all levels (particularly tracks 1.5 and 2).•
Responding to the unprecedented strategic challenge presented by an ASBM 
capability would require the American military and civilian leadership to face hard 
truths, and continue to develop innovative new capabilities. The United States has 
many options here, and it must be prepared to exercise them. The most perilous 
approach would be to neglect such military innovation while continuing to insist 
that the United States maintained its ability to keep the peace, when in fact the 
military capabilities that underpin that ability were diminishing, at least in a rela-
tive sense. Such a discrepancy between rhetoric and reality would erode America’s 
regional credibility and fuel Chinese overconfi dence. The prospect of document-
ing that discrepancy publicly might motivate China to conduct a demonstration 
of an ASBM; a successful test could create the impression that American power-
projection capabilities—and the regional credibility that depends on them—had 
been dramatically diminished. Managing the proper response to this potential 
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“game changer” will demand close scrutiny from scholars, analysts, and policy 
makers alike, as it will critically infl uence America’s place in the Pacifi c for de-
cades to come.
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